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Abstract: 
This thesis looks at the relationship between oil wealth and human development in Africa. 
Given that so many hydrocarbon rich countries across the continent have failed to harness 
such revenues to achieve meaningful development, this paper constructs statistical models to 
determine the exact workings of the paradox of plenty. In doing so, it identifies corruption 
and, more importantly, political structure and regime type as the primary hindrances to 
unlocking natural and economic benefits of oil production. This paper therefore illustrates 
that the resource curse in Africa is a by-product of poor governance only. The case studies of 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon further highlight this reality.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The research question 
Resource wealth, particularly hydrocarbon wealth, is all too often written off as a sordid 
blessing in Africa. Between 2004 and 2007, for example, the British Broadcasting 
Commission (BBC) conducted various polls to determine the public’s response to the 
discovery of vast oil and gas reserves across the continent.1 As participants wrote in from all 
corners of the world, a common fatalistic attitude emerged. Throughout the debate, many 
concluded that such discoveries would only contribute to the region’s woes and paradoxically 
worsen human development. One writer from Angola, for example, noted that it brings 
corruption, war and an unbalanced economy. A participant from Zimbabwe shared the same 
sentiment by declaring that oil would be just another reason for Africans to kill each other. 
Moreover, one writer from Nigeria even went so far to say that Africans must shut the ground 
if they want peace and progress for their citizenry. Damning comments did not stem from the 
developing world only, as participants from first world countries shared the same views. One 
writer from the United Kingdom noted that natural resources have never made a country rich 
for example, whilst another British participant concluded, “Quite frankly, I view all African 
natural resources as a curse on a poor continent run by thugs galore.”2  
The above opinions all suggest that hydrocarbon wealth forms part of a resource curse in 
Africa. This term, first coined by the economist Richard Auty in 1993, describes the 
phenomenon he explored of how countries with rich resources often develop more slowly, 
more corruptly, more violently and with more authoritarian governments than others.3 The 
very notion of a curse however, is seductive as it prematurely determines the future of such 
countries. In doing so, it remains a shallow assessment that fails to penetrate deeper questions 
surrounding the role of resources, particularly oil and gas, across the continent. This paper 
moves beyond such conclusions in an attempt to answer the question, ‘what is the 
relationship between oil wealth and human development in Africa?’In doing so, it will not 
only test the validity of this so-called resource curse but also highlight governance as a 
primary factor driving future outcomes.  
                                                          
1 British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) “Africa’s Oil: a Blessing or a Curse?” Accessed November 2011. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3537045.stm 
2 BBC. “Africa’s Oil: a Blessing or a Curse?” 
3 Richard M Auty. Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies (London: Routledge, 1993)  
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This assessment is particularly important given recent and significant discoveries of oil and 
gas reserves in Africa. Where continental producers in the hydrocarbon market traditionally 
stemmed from the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, new players are constantly emerging. 
These include the likes of Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia among many others.4 A real opportunity to 
harness resource wealth to achieve meaningful development, eradicate poverty and reverse 
age-old notions associated with the continent therefore exists. To achieve such growth and 
progress however, a more holistic understanding of the role of oil and gas reserves becomes 
imperative.   
Existing research and gaps in the literature 
A vast body of work on the resource curse already exists. Within the literature, two distinct 
schools of thought are evident. On the one hand, social scientists associate resource wealth 
with poor economic performance: an almost fundamental paradox. On the other hand, some 
academics tie such wealth to adverse social and political consequences including deep-seated 
corruption, institutional weakness, the advent of autocracy and widespread conflict. The 
following chapter will elaborate on each of these findings. 
Despite the robustness of these associations, a few shortcomings remain thereby warranting 
new research. Firstly, the literature often fails to determine the effect of resources in Africa 
only. On the contrary, social scientists merely infer associations from other developing 
regions to the continent even though it has its own unique political and economic history. 
Secondly, research on the resource curse seldom focuses exclusively on oil and gas. The very 
nature of the oil and gas industry, which remains so exclusive, may produce very different 
outcomes than mineral production, for example. Thirdly, and most importantly for this study, 
social scientists have produced little research on the direct relationship between hydrocarbons 
and human development.  In this regard, academics merely extend those associations as 
mentioned above to include some vague assessment of its affect on living standards and 
poverty. Bearing in mind that the continent hosts some of the world’s most impoverished 
countries, this shortcoming weakens former assessments. 
Taken together, these gaps only inspire greater questions surrounding the current and future 
role of hydrocarbon production in Africa. This paper will address each one of these 
                                                          
4 Duncan Clarke. Crude Continent: The Struggle for Africa’s Oil Prize (London: Profile Books, 2008) 521 
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limitations. Not only will it focus exclusively on the continent, where all countries considered 
stem from Africa only, but it isolates oil and gas production out of all resources and measures 
its impact on human development in terms of living standards. To achieve this distinction, 
this paper uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in the form of case studies.   
By combining statistical models with case studies, this paper takes a mixed-method approach, 
known as a ‘Nested Analysis’ approach,5 to answering the research question. This strategy 
improves the quality of the research as statistical models not only provide a tangible 
appreciation for the role of hydrocarbons in Africa but also assist in identifying suitable case 
studies. Moreover, this approach enables this paper to identify patterns in the data whilst 
applying International Relations theories to account for any unanswered questions.  
Roadmap 
The following chapter provides a basic assessment and test of the resource curse. After 
conducting a thorough review of the relevant literature, it moves onto establish the very first 
statistical model for this paper. This model determines the direct relationship between oil and 
gas wealth in Africa and human development, measured in terms of country poverty levels. 
This first model, which provides the foundation for subsequent chapters, reveals somewhat 
surprising results as it indicates that such wealth has close to no effect on human growth 
whatsoever. It even suggests that an increase in hydrocarbon wealth is futile as it neither 
improves nor worsens living standards.  
Given this almost counterintuitive result, Chapter Three seeks to determine why oil and gas 
revenues remain so negligible to the continent by building on the statistical model. In 
returning to those associations discussed in the literature, it identifies corruption as the 
primary culprit. Unaccountability at the state level therefore almost exactly cancels out any 
possible beneficial outcomes naturally emanating from resource revenues.  
Chapter Four subsequently seeks to determine whether regime type plays a role in mitigating 
this unwanted outcome. In distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies, the 
statistical model identifies that although fuel wealth amounts to greater unaccountability in 
both regime types; it is multiple times more destructive in the authoritarian state.  
                                                          
5 Evan Lieberman. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” American 
Political Science Review 99 (2005) 
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To demonstrate this difference, Chapter Five evaluates and compares the case studies of 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon where the latter represents a more open society. Although both 
countries have had a history of one party rule, this chapter argues that small allowances for 
freedom in a state unlock immense potential from oil and gas wealth. The representative state 
therefore remains the most promising in overcoming the paradox of plenty.  
Finally, Chapter Six turns to conclude by summarising each section to reiterate the political 
economic aspect of the resource curse. In doing so, it argues that adverse outcomes 
emanating from oil and gas wealth are not inevitable but are rather direct results of poor 
governance. It further highlights the importance of this study given the emergence of new oil 
players across Africa and identifies areas for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Oil, Poverty and the Resource Curse 
Oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life, life without work, life for free... The 
concept of oil expresses perfectly the eternal human dream of wealth achieved through lucky 
accident... In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like every fairy tale a bit of a lie.6 
The discovery of oil generates promises and in doing so many come to regard this resource as 
the key to endless possibility. As identified by Ryszard Kapuscinski in the above quote from 
his account of the failures of Iran during the rise of its hydrocarbons industry, these promises 
seldom make the crossover from rhetoric to reality. On the contrary, opportunities for the 
common man frequently remain unchanged and often deteriorate. Nowhere is this false sense 
of hope more apparent than across Africa where leaders vehemently deny intoxication with 
oil whilst pointing to futures akin to the likes of Alaska, Canada and Norway. Whilst African 
players in the industry remain markedly diverse in both their own political histories and oil 
ascendancies, the continent remains connected by paradoxical realities.  Despite the 
accumulation of billions of dollars in oil revenues, poverty remains a common burden.  
Table 2.1: Ratios of poverty among top oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
Crude oil 
production  
per capita for 
2008/2009 
(barrels per 
annum)7 
Percentage of 
the population 
living below the 
poverty line 
since 20058 
Nigeria 5*  70 
Angola 38 41 
Congo, Republic of 24 50 
Equatorial Guinea 192 70 
Gabon 59 32 
     
*Nigeria has one of the world’s largest populations, which may undermine its production capability per capita. 
It remains the continent’s largest producer however.  
                                                          
6 Ryszard Kapuscinski, Shah of Shahs (New York: Harcourt, 1983) 34 
7  British Petroleum. “Statistical Review of World Energy 2011,” accessed August 2011, 
http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy.do?categoryId=7500&contentId=7068481 
8 National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.   
This data has been taken from the following two sites: Central Intelligence Agency. “CIA World Fact Book: 
Population Below the Poverty Line” Accessed August 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2046.html, and 
The World Bank. “World Bank Data on Poverty.” Accessed August 2011,     
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/CG?display=graph 
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The above table indicates that not even African heavyweights in the global oil market, in 
particular Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, have used their oil 
wealth to escape age-old stereotypes associated with the continent. On the contrary, these 
figures suggest some association between the hydrocarbons industry and poverty where oil 
production appears to go hand in hand with high ratios of underdevelopment. This seeming 
association reinforces those opinions of the global community as identified in Chapter One. 
It is figures such as these, as well as those pertaining to all aspects of poor development that 
demand a study that seeks to discover whether oil naturally contributes to poverty across the 
African continent: a study that provides a deeper understanding of the alleged resource curse.   
In this regard, this chapter introduces the very first statistical model established in an effort to 
identify any relationship between the hydrocarbons industry and poverty. This model 
essentially tests the so-called resource curse and provides a foundation for subsequent 
chapters. To place later findings in context, this chapter will first conduct a brief reflection on 
the literature. In doing so, a gap in the work regarding poverty becomes apparent. 
Economic effects of resources 
One of the biggest conundrums that astound social scientists in studying the resource curse is 
the adverse relationship between resources and economic growth. Long before Sachs and 
Warner’s statistical models confirmed such results in the 1990s,9 academics offered a variety 
of theories. One such academic was the Argentine economist: Raúl Prebisch. 
Prebisch derived the developing world’s dependence on natural resources from its colonial 
past. He claimed that former colonisers urged their territories to embark on comparative 
advantage in the hope of achieving some form of sustained economic growth. In doing so, 
primary goods driven economies locked states into supplying raw materials to a world market 
whose prices fell relative to the prices of the manufactured goods they imported.10 Prebisch 
therefore highlighted declining terms of trade as one of the fundamental culprits undermining 
growth in underdeveloped regions, such as Africa. 
                                                          
9 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Centre 
for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997) 
10 Angus Deaton, “Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (1999) 8 
See also See Raúl Prebisch, “International Trade and Payments in an Era of Coexistence: Commercial Policy in 
the Underdeveloped Countries,” American Economic Review 49 (1959) 
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Evidence supporting this hypothesis remains weak however, as there is little statistical 
support for the existence of long-term declines in the terms of trade of developing states.11 
Despite this lack of evidence, Prebisch’s work requires recognition as it laid the foundations 
for future research into price volatility: an acknowledged source of poor economic growth.  
Resource prices, particularly in the hydrocarbons industry, are infamous for being unstable 
and unpredictable. Such volatility adversely affects growth initiatives in resource dependent 
states. According to Paul Collier, price crashes in these markets have the potential to cause a 
loss of income of around seven percent of gross domestic product (GDP).12 In such instances, 
this shock may then trigger a cumulative contraction of the economy over the next two or 
three years which leads to an additional loss of output of around 14 percent of GDP.13  In 
sub-Saharan Africa, these shocks are generally short-lived but in one-third of cases, shocks 
become permanent.14 This boom – bust cycle of resource prices not only affects the economy 
directly by causing it to contract, but it affects the ability of resource dependent states to plan 
for the long run. In doing so, it becomes difficult for the state to distinguish between market 
shifts, trends and long run implications of resource depletion.15  
The phenomenon of ‘Dutch Disease’ also provides insight into the seeming curse of resource 
dependent states. Taken from the Netherlands’ experience, where the discovery of large 
natural gas deposits in the North Sea adversely affected non-oil segments of its economy,16 
this ‘illness’ has become synonymous with resource wealth.  
A country is prone to Dutch Disease following a sudden export boom in its economy. The 
discovery of natural wealth such as oil may trigger such a boom. This surge in the economy 
causes the country’s exchange rate to appreciate, which weakens the economy’s 
competitiveness and causes its traditional export sector to shrink. This process is the 
‘spending effect.’ Following this initial shock to the economy, long run symptoms materialise 
as the increase in demand for the now booming sector results in a shift of capital and labour 
                                                          
11 Raymond Mikesell, “Explaining the Resource Curse with Special Reference to Mineral Exporting Countries,” 
Resource Policy 4 (1998)192 
12 Paul Collier, “Primary Commodity Dependence and Africa’s Future,” in The New Reform Agenda, ed. Boris 
Pleskovic and Nicholas Stern (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003) 3 
13 Collier, “Primary Commodity Dependence,” 3 
14 Paul Cashin and Catherine Pattillo, “The Duration of Terms of Trade Shocks in sub-Saharan Africa,” Finance 
and Development 2 (2000) 2 
15 Alan Gelb and Ginger Turner, “Confronting the Resource Curse: Lessons of Experience for African oil 
producers” Globalisation and Economic Success: Policy Lessons for Developing Countries, ed. Barry Desker, 
Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills (Johannesburg, Brenthurst Foundation, 2008) 43 
16 Christine Ebrahim-Zadeh, “Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely,” Finance and 
Development 1 (2003) 50 
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which often results in an almost permanent deindustrialisation of the state. This final process 
is the ‘resource – movement effect’ in which the opportunity to learn by doing and establish a 
more diversified and robust economy is foregone.17  
‘Dutch disease’ through resource wealth therefore provides another explanation for the 
alleged negative relationship between oil wealth and economic growth.    
Governance effects of resources 
Apart from adversely affecting economic growth, many have tied resources to poor 
governance in naturally wealthy states. In this regard, academics highlight corruption, 
institutional weakness and political instability as inevitable symptoms of the resource curse.  
The resource rich state is known as the perfect breeding ground for corruption. With the flood 
of sudden wealth generated from resources, the work ethic of the elite frequently 
disintegrates, as position and reward are isolated from talent and diligence. Prosperity is 
therefore perceived to arrive without effort as the ‘work-reward’ linkage is severed.18 The 
‘production state’ becomes the ‘allocation state’ where government is perceived as a vast 
gravy train of handouts and pet projects where patron-client relations remain the only viable 
option for individuals to gain a piece of the national pie.19 Financial corruption, through 
which government officials rob and pillage the state, remains inevitable.  
So rife is corruption in oil rich regions across Africa that many accept it as the norm. Former 
President Omar Bongo of oil-rich Gabon, for example, once asserted that corruption “is not 
an African word.” 20  
In addition to fostering corruption, social scientists assert that resources undermine 
institutional strength and the rule of law.21 Hoff and Stiglitz find that in resource rich states, 
where natural endowments constitute a large source of income, a portion of the population 
finds it has an interest in the persistence of a weak rule of law.22 This inefficient and 
                                                          
17 Warner Corden, “The Economic Effects of a Booming Sector,” International Social Science Journal 3 (1983) 
444-445 
18 Douglas Yates, Enhancing the Governance of Africa’s Oil Sector (Occasional Paper no. 51) (Johannesburg: 
South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009) 7 
19 John Ghazvinian, Untapped: the Scramble for Africa’s Oil, (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 2007)103 
20 Omar Bongo, Blanc Comme Nègre: Entretiens avec Airy Routier, (Paris: Grasset, 2001) 223 
21 Sachs and Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, 23 
22 Karla Hoff and Joseph Stiglitz,  Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in post-Communist Societies: 
Coordination Failures and Conflict of Interest, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002) 
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permeable state subsequently becomes vulnerable to the final governance effect of resources: 
conflict.   
According to a variety of theories, resources and rebellion go hand-in-hand. Various reasons 
put forth for this association include greed, geography or because some resources are easier 
to loot. These reasons fall part of the resource-predation theory, geographical location theory 
and lootability-obstructability theory. 23 In Africa, the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) 
in Angola and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Sudan personify these 
paradigms. Although state structures are fragile across the entire continent, natural resources, 
particularly oil, appear to be quite conducive to breeding political instability.  
This review of the literature has identified associations between resources and poor economic 
growth because of comparative advantage, price volatility or Dutch disease in addition to 
associations between resources and poor governance such as corruption, institutional 
weakness and political instability. These findings are tried and tested associations. Despite 
their robustness however, questions concerning poverty remain unanswered. The following 
statistical model accounts for this relationship.  
Introducing the statistical model  
This study constructed a model, which includes all states from sub – Saharan as well as North 
Africa, to quantify and have a tangible appreciation for the affect of oil on poverty. Data for 
the model stems from the year 2008, as this was the most recent year for which all data was 
available. The model also excludes smaller states such as islands as well as states for which 
data was missing,24 thereby ensuring a more robust analysis. 
Before this chapter turns to analyze patterns in the data, all variables used in the model 
require an introduction: beginning with the dependent variable pertaining to poverty.  
The Human Poverty Index (HPI), which the United Nations (UN) first introduced in the 
Human Development Report of 1997, represents the dependent variable. Although the 
institution has recently released a new measurement of poverty, known as the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index, it fails to include top oil producers originating from Africa. 
Such states excluded include the likes of Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Sudan. These oil 
                                                          
23 Yates, Enhancing the Governance of Africa’s Oil Sector (Occasional Paper no. 51), 9 
24 See Appendix, Table 2.1 
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producers remain central to later models thus rendering the Multidimensional Poverty Index 
less useful for this analysis.  
The HPI uses various indicators pertaining to different dimensions of deprivation to measure 
poverty. For developing states, the UN uses the HPI-1 in which three levels of deprivation are 
considered. The first level relates to survival where the probability of not surviving to the age 
of forty represents the likeliness of death. The second dimension of deprivation pertains to 
knowledge where the UN considers adult literacy rates. Finally, the third level relates to a 
decent standard of living where in developing states the institution measures the unweighted 
average of the percentage of the population without access to safe water and the percentage 
of children underweight for their age.25 The UN averages each of these levels of deprivation 
and combines them to form a value lying between 0 and 100 where ratios lying closer to 100 
represent impoverished societies.26  
The HPI therefore moves beyond traditional measures of poverty that typically encompass 
indicators pertaining to income. Through this index, the UN considers basic dimensions of 
human development and defines poverty as the ability of the population to acquire and use 
capabilities.27 This broad analysis inspired the inclusion of the HPI in the statistical model. 
Fuel revenue per capita, taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s (UNCTAD) handbook of statistics, serves as the independent variable for this 
model.28 UNCTAD defines fuel as a wide array of materials that produce energy including 
mineral fuel and lubricants.29 The independent variable therefore ascertains whether oil is 
present in a state and whether the distribution of its revenue is fair. 
In addition to the above independent and dependent variables, the statistical model included 
the geographic and political economic features of states to serve as control variables. Controls 
considered included indicators pertaining to population size, non-fuel revenues per capita, 
whether a state was land locked or not and degrees of trade openness. After testing the 
                                                          
25 United Nations Development Programme “The Human Poverty Index (HPI),” Human Development Reports, 
accessed July 2011, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hpi 
26 See Appendix, Table 2.2 
27 Sue Bowden and Blessing Chiripanhura: “Measuring and Explaining Poverty in Six African countries: a Long 
Period Approach,” Journal of International Development 20 (2008) 1059 
28 See Appendix, Table 2.3 
29 United Nations “Detailed structure and explanatory notes on Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) Rev. 3,” accessed July 2011, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=14 
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applicability of each of these controls, non-fuel revenues per capita, population size and the 
location of a state30 remained the most significant.  
With these political economic and geographic features of African states considered, the 
diagram in the following section illustrates the first statistical model used to test whether a 
direct relationship between oil and poverty exists. 
Results from the statistical model 
Figure One: The relationship between oil and poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To clarify the effect fuel wealth has on poverty, this study first tested the direct relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables without the inclusion of controls. The 
results that followed were logical. Higher fuel revenues per capita, which translate into more 
income per household, appeared conducive to lowering levels of poverty and raising living 
standards across the continent.31 The North African states of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia from 
the sample solidified this finding as they each have relatively low values on the HPI whilst 
being major oil exporters.  
After including the controls however, the relationship between fuel revenues per capita and 
poverty transformed. Where patterns in the data previously suggested that higher revenues 
were conducive to lowering levels of poverty, it now indicated that these revenues had close 
to no effect on living standards whatsoever. The inclusion of the geographic and political 
                                                          
30 See Appendix, Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 
31 See Appendix, Table 2.7 
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economic features of states therefore resulted in the direct relationship between hydrocarbon 
wealth and poverty approximating zero at positive 0.04, as illustrated in the above model.32  
Interpretation of the results 
This finding, albeit somewhat counterintuitive, does not necessarily suggest that natural 
resources and human development are mutually exclusive, however. On the contrary, it 
indicates that revenues originating from the hydrocarbons industry have less impact on living 
standards than any other source of income in the state. In effect, this means that US$50 
originating from the non-resource sector in an African economy, such as the banking sector, 
has more potential to benefit a family and raise living standards than US$50 emanating from 
the hydrocarbon sector. The question remains then: what is it about fuel revenues in 
comparison to other revenues that make them so negligible to African people? 
Concluding remarks 
The fairytale like quality of oil, as alluded to in the opening quote of this chapter, suggested 
that the mere presence of this resource generates an illusion of prosperity that never 
materialises into reality.  
The statistical model established in this chapter however, negated this. Once it introduced 
controls variables, no strong direct relationship between fuel wealth and poverty could be 
found. Such wealth apparently neither improves nor worsens the living standards of African 
people. Moreover, the model even suggested that additional fuel revenue per capita across the 
continent was insignificant.  
This finding generates deeper questions into the paradox of plenty. To better understand and 
effectively test the resource curse, it now becomes imperative to know why such wealth is so 
futile to Africans, especially given its abundance. A return to those associations already 
identified in the literature review provides some direction in this regard.  
The following chapter turns to look at the effect of corruption in oil rich African states to 
account for the lack of beneficial outcomes emanating from resource revenues. Corruption is 
therefore the first governance factor considered and used to trace an indirect pathway 
between the independent and dependent variables in this analysis. 
                                                          
32 See Appendix, Table 2.8 
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Chapter Three: the Role of Corruption 
Poverty is an outcome of the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions.33 
Civil society, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations alike 
have long acknowledged the debilitating effects of corruption in African economies. This 
acknowledgement demands the inclusion of corruption in the assessment of the relationship 
between oil and poverty. This chapter will consequently expand on the basic statistical 
model, as identified in Figure One of Chapter Two. In doing so, it will create room to 
consider poor governance as an explanatory variable for not only the lack of a relationship 
between hydrocarbon wealth and human development but also for the suggested 
ineffectiveness of fuel revenues in raising the living standards of African people.  
Before turning to analyze the data, this chapter will conduct a brief recap of the relevant 
literature pertaining to corruption in oil-rich countries. With a sound understanding of the 
literature, this chapter will subsequently move on to trace an indirect pathway between oil 
and poverty and identify poor governance as a hindrance to any natural and beneficial 
outcomes oil revenues may generate in an African economy.  
Patterns in the data will therefore prove that corruption almost exactly cancels out potential, 
positive spinoff effects of oil: bringing the model one-step closer to a more holistic 
understanding of the resource curse.  
A review of the literature on corruption 
As soon as one begins to look at the literature pertaining to oil and corruption, one comes 
across a vast body of contradictory work. On the one hand, the majority asserts that the very 
presence of oil in a state directly results in a lack of accountability.34 On the other hand, 
opponents find absolutely no correlation between the hydrocarbons industry and corruption.35 
Relevant arguments put forth in support of the latter include the following: 
Firstly, corruption across Africa is not limited to oil producing states but is evident within 
every state structure. The very political and economic ascendancies of such states seem to 
have bred unaccountability where social scientists attribute this phenomenon to what some 
                                                          
33 World Bank. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: World Bank and Oxford 
University Press,  2001) 99 
34 See Michael Ross. Extractive Sectors and the Poor. (California: Oxfam America, 2001)  
35 See Jean-Philippe C. Stijns, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited,” Resources 
Policy 30 (Boston: Elsevier, 2005) 
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call the medievalism of the continent.36 Secondly, it is difficult to assert that only once top 
producers in Africa started to extract oil, did they become corrupt. One cannot even begin to 
claim that the likes of Chad or the Republic of Congo were the epitome of good governance 
before they discovered hydrocarbons beneath their soil, for example.  
Despite the weight attached to these arguments, statistical findings presented later on will 
suggest some association between the two factors where patterns in the data correlate higher 
fuel revenues per capita with higher levels of unaccountability. Although this finding is not 
conclusive, it does demand a review of the literature that identifies the somewhat corrupt 
nature of the hydrocarbons industry: even if fuel is only exacerbating current levels of 
unaccountability.  
In Africa and other resource rich regions, fuel revenues seem conducive to doing just that. 
Without well-established institutions, governments are able to generate high location specific 
rents from fuel production without any major economic repercussions. In doing so, the state 
becomes isolated from its electorate, as it no longer needs to embark on traditional methods 
of taxation to raise revenues.37 Government subsequently becomes an exclusive entity and 
sidelines the majority, particularly the poor.  
Many refer to this type of corruption, which frequently captures newspaper headlines and 
public disapproval, as ‘big-time corruption.’ International organisations have recently begun 
to call for the acknowledgement of ‘quiet corruption’ in Africa however, as this may prove 
more damaging than its counterpart. In this regard, ‘big time corruption’ establishes a 
mentality that leads to ‘quiet corruption’ through which malpractice of front line providers 
becomes the norm. This may include small actions such as lower effort levels, absenteeism or 
even a slight bending of entrenched rules: all of which serve to undermine developmental 
efforts within the state.38  
The literature on corruption demonstrates how unaccountability in an oil rich economy 
contributes to lower levels of development and hence poverty. The very nature of the oil 
industry, which remains infamous for its exclusivity, thus serves to marginalise the masses 
and benefit a select few. Without sound institutions, the poorest of the poor must rely on 
patron client relations to gain a piece of the national pie. Big time and quiet corruption 
                                                          
36 Clarke, Crude Continent, 524 - 541 
37 Paul Collier, “Primary Commodity Dependence,” 5 
38 World Bank. Silent and lethal: How Quiet Corruption Undermines Africa’s Development Efforts. 
(Washington, DC: the World Bank, 2010) 
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consequently go hand-in-hand in undermining beneficial outcomes emanating from fuel 
revenues. The following statistical model quantifies this effect.  
Introducing corruption in the statistical model 
The Worldwide Governance Indicator project, a World Bank Group venture, produces and 
updates a corruption index biannually, which measures the extent of corruption in all states. 
The body traditionally defines corruption as the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including petty and grand forms of corruption, and uses scores of variables from surveys and 
polls of experts in each country as the basis for this indicator.39 It then divides this data into 
five groups to form percentile ranks lying between two point estimates: negative 2.5 and 
positive 2.5.40 Scores lying closer to positive 2.5 correspond with higher levels of 
unaccountability.41 The following table demonstrates measurements from this index as it 
identifies the top five most corrupt countries in Africa for 2008.  
Table 3.1: Top Corruption Scores across Africa 
Country Corruption  Score for 200842 
Equatorial Guinea 1.58 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
1.42 
Chad 1.39 
Angola 1.34 
Sudan 1.24 
 
This table highlights the relationship between oil revenues and corruption given that four out 
of the top five most corrupt countries in Africa for 2008 were significant if not primary oil 
producers. These include Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Angola and Sudan. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is not oil poor either although this resource does not constitute the 
largest share of its GDP and so does not amount to much revenue per capita. 
                                                          
39 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” Accessed October 2011. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
40 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.”  
41 This study has reversed the original data in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index for ease of 
interpretation. See Appendix, Table 3.1  
42 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators” 
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Given the robustness and reliability of the corruption index, this study chose to include it in 
its assessment of the effect of fuel revenues per capita on human development.  
Results from the statistical model 
The following diagram illustrates the inclusion of the corruption index in the statistical 
model.43  The relationship between the independent and dependent variable has now 
expanded where two pathways between fuel revenues per capita and the HPI now exist, 
namely: a direct pathway and an indirect one via corruption.  
Figure Two: Tracing the pathway of corruption44  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The direct pathway, shaded green, demonstrates the effect of fuel revenues per capita in an 
African economy without corruption. This pathway previously approximated zero in Chapter 
Two, which suggested that an oil boom in an African country would do little to raise the 
living standards of its people. Once states embark on greater transparency however, an 
increase in such revenue has the potential to produce beneficial results. The above model 
identifies that if governments mitigate corruption, every unit increase in fuel revenues per 
capita may reduce the country’s score on the HPI by 0.46 units.45 Because the sample of 
countries used in this study is relatively small, poverty reduction through oil wealth is merely 
suggested and not guaranteed. Nevertheless, this finding is important as it identifies the 
possibility of human development through hydrocarbon production in Africa.  
On the other hand, the indirect pathway, shaded red, demonstrates the effect of fuel revenues 
per capita in an African economy in face of corruption. This pathway traces an important 
domino effect.   
                                                          
43 Control variables have been excluded in the diagram for ease of interpretation 
44 Statistically significant coefficients (p-value<0.05) have been starred 
45 See Appendix, Table 3.2 Part 1 
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Firstly, fuel revenues are positively associated with corruption. The above model identifies 
that every unit increase in revenues from fuel has the potential to contribute to a 0.08 increase 
on the corruption scale.46 Given that this scale ranges from negative 2.5 to positive 2.5, this 
association constitutes a 1.6 percent increase in poor governance in an oil rich economy every 
time fuel revenues per capita go up, such as during an oil boom.  
This association means that a relatively oil-rich country such as Chad is therefore expected to 
score 0.76 units higher on the corruption index than an oil-poor country such as Ethiopia, all 
else equal. Moreover, this finding further implies differences among top oil producers where 
the Republic of Congo, is expected to score 0.02 units higher than Gabon purely because of 
its extra oil wealth, all else equal again.  
The model also identifies a second positive association along the indirect pathway. This 
association is between corruption and poverty where every unit increase in unaccountability 
has the potential to increase the HPI scale by a whopping 6.09 units.47 On a scale that ranges 
from zero to 100, this amounts to an increase of 6 percent in poverty levels every time an oil 
rich country becomes less transparent. This second association results in the domino effect.  
This finding also means that Chad, which scores so highly on the corruption index because of 
its abundance in oil, is further expected to score 4.62 units higher on the HPI than Ethiopia, 
all else equal. Moreover, higher levels of corruption in the Republic of Congo should result in 
it scoring 0.14 units higher on the HPI than Gabon, all else equal again.  
Interpretation of the results 
These two positive associations, between oil and corruption and thereafter between 
corruption and poverty, demonstrate how fuel revenues coupled with unaccountability 
amounts to underdevelopment in African economies. As a whole, the indirect pathway 
illustrates that every unit increase in fuel revenues per capita in face of corruption has the 
potential to contribute to a 0.47 increase on the HPI scale. This increase explains those 
differences between Chad and Ethiopia, and between the Republic of Congo and Gabon. 
Although it does not seem that much at first, this domino effect is exactly large enough to 
cancel out all possible beneficial outcomes stemming from oil revenues.   
                                                          
46 See Appendix, Table 3.2 Part 2 
47 See Appendix, Table 3.2 Part 1 
23 
 
As previously noted, fuel revenues have the potential to improve living standards in African 
states should governments mitigate corruption. The direct pathway in the model illustrated 
this as it identified a beneficial relationship through which fuel revenues could reduce the 
HPI by 0.46 units. On the contrary, should such states fail on measures of transparency and 
accountability, increases in fuel revenues per capita amount to increases on the HPI of 0.47 
units. The two futures taken together and thus the total effect of fuel revenues in an African 
state, almost exactly cancel each other out. This negation effect explains the lack of a 
relationship between fuel revenues per capita and the HPI initially identified in Chapter Two. 
It further explains stagnant development in oil-rich African economies.  
Corruption therefore remains the primary culprit in this model as it explains why revenues 
originating from fuel sources in an economy are so ineffective at raising the living standards 
of African people. In this regard, the exclusive nature of fuel wealth breeds corruption, which 
in turn amounts to higher poverty and lower standards of living. The indirect pathway 
therefore remains littered with domino effects that serve to cancel out alternative futures.  
Concluding remarks 
In attempting to quantify the role of corruption in the relationship between oil wealth and 
poverty, this chapter found that fuel revenues coupled with unaccountability does not 
necessarily result in underdevelopment but rather creates a stagnant situation where progress 
is limited. Corruption, whether driven by fuel revenues or not, therefore remains a significant 
hurdle to unlocking the economic benefits of natural resources for all African economies 
venturing into the hydrocarbons industry. Without embarking upon on good governance 
measures such economies will only continue to fall behind. 
Given the importance of this finding, deeper penetration into the debate of the resource curse 
is now required. The following chapter addresses questions concerning the role of different 
regimes types in mitigating poor governance. Chapter Four therefore distinguishes between 
democratic and non-democratic oil rich nations in their approach to harnessing fuel revenues 
to raise the living standards of their people.  
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Chapter Four: Democratic and non Democratic Oil Producers 
The pattern of oil wealth fostering corruption rather than economic development will 
continue. The quality of governance, rather than resource endowments, will be the key 
determinant of development and differentiation among African states.48 
The global political economy witnessed a third wave of democratisation over the past twenty 
years through which many former autocracies experienced changes in their regime types and 
approach to the rule of law.  Africa was frequently the location of such developments but in 
hindsight, it becomes apparent that those changes were often insufficient. Tyrannies therefore 
continue to burden the continent where many of the leaders who have been in power the 
longest sit comfortably in major oil and mineral exporting economies. This concentration of 
power coupled with immense resource wealth often amounts to poor governance: the root 
cause of underdevelopment across the continent.    
This chapter will differentiate the effects of corruption in democratic and non-democratic oil-
rich African economies. In doing so, it will identify that the very distribution of power is the 
fundamental determinant of whether they are able to overcome the domino effect and unlock 
natural and logical benefits of oil wealth.  This chapter will further highlight African 
economies that encourage public participation and representation as the most promising. 
To measure the differences between democracies and non-democracies this chapter will 
expand on the statistical model from Chapter Three. In doing so, it will create room for an 
assessment of regime type among African states where it will take measurements of political 
rights and civil liberties from Freedom House. This section will therefore achieve a clear 
distinction between democracies and non-democracies in the African oil industry thereby 
facilitating the selection of case studies for the following chapter.   
Similarly to the section on corruption, this chapter will begin by briefly reflecting on the 
literature pertaining to the role of regime types in oil abundant nations. This will help place 
later findings and discussions in context.  
 
 
                                                          
48 National Intelligence Council and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue 
about the Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2000) 43 
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A review of the literature on regime types and oil economies 
Most of the literature regarding regime types in oil exporting economies seeks to prove that 
the hydrocarbons industry undermines democracy in all states.49 This study will not attempt 
to link these two factors, however. On the contrary, it will take whether a country is 
democratic or not as given and subsequently illustrate the relevant consequences. A variety of 
authors has outlined these effects. 
Joseph Siegle in his study on governance strategies and the resource curse identifies a link 
between regime type and types of growth that promote improved living conditions in oil 
producing states. In a sample of over 50 countries, Siegle finds that autocratic hydrocarbon-
rich states are generally less effective at promoting meaningful development. Between 2000 
and 2005, for example, such countries saw median levels of infant deaths drop by just 4.2 
percent over the five-year period as compared to the 15.3 percent and 18 percent of mixed 
regimes and democracies.50 
Michael Ross also examines the relationship between oil, regime type and poverty across the 
developing world. In his study, he finds that some of the key ailments of oil dependent states, 
including low life expectancy, child mortality and income inequality, diminish when 
government is at least partially democratic. According to Ross, this is because representative 
governments in oil rich economies are less likely to spend vast revenues on the military and 
more like to spend them on health care. Although he concludes that democracy in itself 
cannot solve all the problems of oil dependent states, he identifies openness in a society as 
the first step to achieving better living standards.51  
This brief review of the literature highlights the adverse consequences of autocracies in oil 
rich states as compared to democracies. These findings are applicable to Africa where most 
hydrocarbon-rich states lack representative governments.  
 
 
                                                          
49 See Jeffrey A Frankel. The natural Resource Curse: a Survey (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010) Accessed November 2010. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836, and  
Michael Ross. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (2001)  
50 Joseph Siegle. “Governance strategies to remedy the natural resource curse.” International Social Science 
Journal 57 (2009) 46-48 
51 Ross, Extractive Sectors and the Poor, 18 
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Measuring Freedom 
The international organisation, Freedom House, conducts an annual survey that monitors the 
progress of political rights and civil liberties in 193 countries and 14 related territories. The 
survey rates each country and territory on a scale from one to seven where it considers states 
lying closest to one as most Free. Freedom house bases these ratings on a checklist of 10 
political rights and 15 civil liberty questions.  It therefore considers the electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy, and 
individual rights when rating states. In doing so, it is able to assign each country a status of 
Free, Partly Free or Not Free.52  
Freedom House asserts that its ratings do not merely assess the conduct of governments but 
reflect the realities of daily life. In this regard, its in house regional experts, consultant writers 
and academic advisors weigh the actions of non-state as well as state actors when considering 
freedom.53 In doing so, the organisation is able to factor in the effect of terrorist movements 
or armed groups within a country. This inclusion remains particularly important for many 
hydrocarbon-rich countries in Africa as armed groups continue to hamper freedom in states 
such as in Angola and Nigeria.  
Introducing Freedom in the statistical model 
For this study, it is worthwhile noting that Freedom House considers few states across the 
continent as truly Free. In 2008, for example, only seven countries from the sample were 
categorised as Free, namely: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Senegal and South 
Africa.54  To establish a clear distinction between democracies and non-democracies, Partly 
Free and Free states were therefore categorised together up against those classified as Not 
Free for this analysis.55 Distribution of hydrocarbon-rich56 states in the sample is as follows. 
 
 
                                                          
52 Freedom House. “Methodology.” Accessed October 2011. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010 
53 Freedom House. “Methodology.” 
54 Freedom House. “Map of Freedom in the World: 2008 Edition.” Accessed November 2011 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 
55 See Appendix, Table 4.1  
56 Taken as countries with fuel exports above ten percent of GDP for 2008 
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Table 4.1 Regimes types across African oil producers 
Not Free oil-rich countries Free oil-rich countries 
Algeria Gabon 
Angola Mauritania 
Cameroon Nigeria 
Congo , Republic  
Cote D’Ivoire  
Equatorial Guinea  
Libya  
Sudan  
 
A brief review of the above table identifies that most of the major hydrocarbon-rich states in 
Africa are considered Not Free and therefore autocratic. The statistical models presented 
below measure the effectiveness of these regimes in mitigating corruption and unlocking 
potential beneficial outcomes of resource wealth.  
Results from the statistical model 
As mentioned above, this chapter takes regime type as given and traces the different 
outcomes of fuel revenues in democracies and non-democracies. The statistical models 
therefore look the same as the one presented in Chapter Three for each regime time.57  
Figure Three: Tracing the political economy of oil for democracies and non-democracies58 
Democracies     Non-Democracies 
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The above models identify that both regimes face significant challenges to using their 
resource wealth to raise the living standards of their people. They also suggest that the 
autocratic state has a much tougher time, however.  
For the non-democratic state, the indirect pathway between fuel wealth and poverty via 
corruption is severely destructive. Every unit increase in fuel revenues per capita amounts to 
an increase of 0.11 units on the corruption scale.59 This increase is significantly larger than 
the average increase of only 0.08 units for all states as identified in Chapter Three. 
On the contrary, increases in fuel revenue per capita in a democracy amount to an increase on 
the corruption scale of 0.03 units only.60  Although corruption still results, the magnitude of 
unaccountability is almost four times smaller than in the autocratic state. This is a large 
enough difference to better equip such governments in overcoming the first phase of the 
domino effect.  Bearing in mind the association between corruption and poverty, which 
remains identical for each regime type at positive 7.83,61 the democracy and non-democracy 
now face very different futures.  
Interpretation of the results 
For the democracy, albeit more free, the use of oil wealth in face of corruption still 
contributes to poor living standards as every unit increase in such wealth amounts to a 0.2 
unit increase on the HPI. In comparison to the autocracy however, this increase is slight, as 
oil wealth in the hands of a dictator has the potential to increase the HPI by 0.9 units every 
time resources generate more revenue. Greater oil production in corrupt, non-representative 
states therefore remains at least four times more destructive to African people than in a state 
that is participatory and open.  
What is most interesting is that if the non-democratic state eradicated corruption from its 
affairs it would have the potential to concentrate its resources on improving the living 
standards of its people more effectively than the free society. Increases in fuel revenues per 
capita in the non-democratic state without corruption, for example, has the potential to reduce 
the HPI by 0.69 units, as indicated by the green arrow.62 On the contrary, the democratic state 
                                                          
59 See Appendix, Table 4.2 Part 2 
60 See Appendix, Table 4.2 Part 2 
61 See Appendix, Table 4.2 Part 1 
62 See Appendix, Table 4.2 Part 1 
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is able to channel these resources to reduce the index by 0.23 units only.63 As noted in 
Chapter Two, because the sample size for this study is so small, poverty reduction through 
managed oil wealth in both regime types is merely suggested and not guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, this analysis identifies that corruption is damaging to both the democratic and 
autocratic state, but, more importantly, that it is multiple times more destructive in the latter. 
The indirect pathway, upon which the domino effect lies, is therefore littered with pitfalls for 
the non-democracy. Because so many oil-rich African countries in the sample lack 
representative governments, as illustrated in Table 4.1, a closer review of the relationship 
between regime type, hydrocarbons and unaccountability is necessary.   
Simulating the effects of regime type 
To quantify all possible outcomes in oil-rich democratic and non-democratic states, this 
chapter ran a series of simulations.64 Such simulations permitted it to measure all 
corresponding levels of corruption to increasing levels in fuel revenue per capita within each 
regime type. The following graphs illustrate these outcomes and highlight the stronger 
relationship between oil wealth and unaccountability in the non-democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 See Appendix, Table 4.2 Part 1 
64 See Appendix, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4  
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Figure Four: Fuel revenues per capita and expected corruption scores for non-democracies 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Five: Fuel revenues per capita and expected corruption scores for democracies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At low levels of fuel revenue per capita, the non-democratic state achieves remarkable levels 
of transparency as illustrated by the solid line in Figure Four. Where there is absolutely no 
fuel wealth in the country, levels of unaccountability approximate an expected corruption 
score of negative 0.38.65 Such high levels of good governance remain unprecedented across 
the continent as traditionally only countries who are members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) achieve such openness. Moreover, the 
above diagrams illustrate that the oil-poor non-democratic state is actually more accountable 
than the oil-poor democratic state as the latter’s expected score on the corruption index 
approximates positive 0.25 only.66  
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Once oil starts to generate greater revenues in each economy however, the realities between 
democratic and non-democratic states quickly reverse and diverge. The dotted line in each 
diagram represents this change, which is effectively the domino effect.  
Upon greater access to oil wealth, the expected score on the corruption index for the 
autocracy increases exponentially to approximate a positive two on the governance scale67 
whilst it approximates just over 0.5 in the open society.68 Increased access to fuel revenues 
has therefore caused the non-democracy to score more than two units higher on the index, 
whilst the same access has caused the democracy to score an additional 0.25 units only.  
A 35 percent gap in transparency between the two regime types now exists. This gap is now 
similar to differences on the corruption index found between countries such as Norway and 
Costa Rica, and Canada and Cuba. In fact, upon increased access to fuel wealth, the 
autocratic oil-rich African economy has quickly become as corrupt as countries such as Iran 
and Iraq.69 
Such high levels of unaccountability make it exponentially difficult for fuel wealth to reach 
the masses and raise the living standards of African people in non-democratic states. In the 
absence of relevant institutions to guard against the greed of such wealth, the autocratic state 
quickly experiences an almost unstoppable domino effect. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter sought to build on the model of Chapter Three and identify the role of regime 
type in mitigating corruption and overcoming the domino effect of the resource curse. In 
doing so, it noted that corruption remains a hindrance to both the democratic and non-
democratic state as it has the potential to negate beneficial outcomes of resource wealth. 
Where it is a hurdle to the open society however, it is the autocracy’s greatest and most 
important challenge.  
In the absence of resource wealth, the non-representative state has the potential to achieve 
remarkable levels of accountability and transparency, mirroring those found in the developed 
world. As soon as fuel production generates additional revenues in the economy however, the 
state of affairs rapidly deteriorates to mirror levels of unaccountability found in some of the 
                                                          
67 See Appendix, Table 4.4 Parts 2 and 4 
68 See Appendix, Table 4.3 Parts 2 and 4  
69 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.”  
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most destitute places. In this regard, fuel wealth is able to contribute to greater corruption and 
thereby poverty in the closed society primarily because it lacks institutions and mechanisms 
to guard against the domino effect. 
As identified by Collier in Chapter Three,70 the very nature of oil production generates high 
location specific rents. Such rents remain at the disposal of governments. If oil production 
commences in the absence of institutions that promote transparency however, that age-old 
relationship between resource wealth and corruption, which ultimately amounts to poverty 
through the domino effect, quickly materialises. Oil wealth is therefore not an inevitable 
curse but its outcome is directly dependent on the political economy and governance 
structures of African states.  
The following chapter builds on this finding to illustrate the diverging futures of democratic 
and non-democratic oil-rich African economies. To demonstrate the realities and true 
workings of the paradox of plenty it will turn to examine the case studies of Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Paul Collier, “Primary Commodity Dependence,” 5 
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Chapter Five: Case Studies 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a comparative assessment of the oil-rich countries Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon where the former represents a non-democratic society and the latter an 
open one.  
These two countries have much in common. Not only are they each major oil players where 
Equatorial Guinea is the continent’s third largest producer and Gabon its fourth,71 but their 
oil stems from the same source. In this regard, both countries are located alongside each other 
on the west coast of Africa where they each have access to the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf of 
Guinea. With such access, oil production across the two states closely mirrors each other. In 
2008, for example, Equatorial Guinea produced 347 thousand barrels of oil per day whilst 
Gabon produced 235.72 This production further forms a large share of national income where 
those barrels of oil constituted more than 50 percentage of GDP in each country for 2008.73 
Fuel revenues per capita are therefore similar as citizens in each country have access to 
thousands upon thousands of dollars in oil revenue.74  
In addition to similarities in oil wealth and location, it is useful to note that the countries 
share political economic features as well. Population size in each state is below two million, 
for example.75 This low population size should enable each country to fast track development 
through oil wealth and raise living standards.  
With all these parallels between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, the only significant difference 
between the two states concerns governance. Although both countries have a history of one-
party rule, Gabon has achieved greater openness than its counterpart has. This study is aware 
that many social scientists would not regard Gabon as an exemplary model of good 
governance but it is important to note that the continent fails to produce true exceptions.  
The following sections will therefore discuss the political economies of each state to 
highlight the advantages of achieving greater openness in an oil-rich country. Despite its 
shortcomings, Gabon provides important and useful lessons.   
                                                          
71 British Petroleum. “Statistical Review of World Energy.” 
72 British Petroleum. “Statistical Review of Word Energy.” 
73 African Development Bank. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production in Africa and the Global Market 
Situation. (Tunis: AFDB, 2010) 8  
74 See Appendix, Table 2.3  
75 See Appendix, Table 2.5  
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Case Study: Equatorial Guinea 
References to Equatorial Guinea have always been contradictory in nature. On the one hand, 
the country’s despotic history and self-isolation from international affairs have often likened 
it to North Korea. On the other hand however, the sheer possibility that oil wealth generates 
in this small nation has caused many to label it the Kuwait of Africa. With such conflicting 
futures, the question remains then: where does reality lie? 
The story of Equatorial Guinea is one of forgone opportunity. As the continent’s third largest 
producer of hydrocarbons as well as the country with the highest GDP per capita,76 
development of a population of less than one million people should be an attainable goal.  
The rule of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema and his cronies however, have single-
handedly hampered this achievement. Oil funds and state wealth therefore remain a family 
affair where billions upon billions of dollars disappear from government coiffeurs. So rife is 
poor governance in this country that it remains the continent’s most corrupt nation according 
to the World Bank’s corruption index77 where even the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) has expelled it from its ranks.  
It is for these reasons that this study chose Equatorial Guinea as its case study to highlight the 
debilitating effects of autocracy. This section will provide an assessment of the country’s 
political economic history to demonstrate the domino effect where entrenched authoritarian 
rule remains the fundamental culprit.  
The rise of autocracy and oil wealth 
Autocracy has been a part of Equatorial Guinea’s history since it gained independence from 
Spain on 12 October 1968.78 Although citizens voted in Francisco Macias Nguema as their 
first president, Macias wasted no time in manipulating state power to his will as by 1970, he 
had banned all other political parties and by 1972 had declared himself president for life.79 
The first decade of independence subsequently witnessed immense political misrule and 
economic chaos under his leadership, so often characterized by extreme political repression. 
On 3 August 1979, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the nephew of the then current leader, 
overthrew Macias in a violent coup with the assistance of a group of military and naval 
                                                          
76 See Appendix, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
77 See Appendix, Table 3.1  
78 Central Intelligence Agency. “CIA World Fact Book: Equatorial Guinea.” Accessed October 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ek.html 
79 Clarke, Crude Continent, 137 
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officers.80  Nguema has been the president since then, making him the continent’s longest 
serving dictator today along with José Eduardo Dos Santos of oil-rich Angola.  
By the time Equatorial Guinea discovered lucrative offshore oil fields, first with Alba and 
then Zafiro in the mid-1990s,81 autocracy along with all its other side effects of institutional 
weakness, oppression and corruption had been the only system of rule for almost three 
decades. The very first dollar from oil wealth was therefore generated in what at the time was 
one of the world’s least open societies. This flood of sudden resource wealth subsequently 
contributed to the deterioration of institutions along with the marginalisation of the poor.  
Deep-seated corruption 
Oil production started to pump wealth into the Equatorial Guinean economy from around 
1997-1998. Fortunately, Worldwide Governance Indicators and the corruption index stem 
this far back. Although the state was by no means the epitome of good governance before it 
discovered oil, as mentioned above, this study notes the rapid deterioration of institutions 
thereafter. 
The lowest level of corruption that Equatorial Guinea has experienced in the last 15 years 
was between 1996 and 1998. During this period, the country’s score on the corruption index 
was already high as it hovered around positive 1.22 to positive 1.25.82 This study takes these 
scores in the absence of oil wealth. The following decade and a half however, saw scores on 
the corruption index quickly increase and peak within only six years of access to fuel 
revenues at positive 1.68:83 an increase of almost nine percent in poor governance.  Although 
corruption has decreased since, unaccountability continues to remain disproportionately high. 
Oil wealth has therefore contributed to the corruption of the work ethic of the elite as well as 
vast financial corruption in the state.  
Patron-client relations, for example, remain the only viable option for Equatorial Guineans to 
gain a piece of the national pie where nepotism in power structures is rife. By 2008, 21 out 
the 50 ministers in government were related to President Nguema.84 Moreover, Nguema 
recruits all members of his armed forces from his hometown in Mongomo where he 
                                                          
80 Clarke, Crude Continent,  137 
81 Clarke, Crude Continent, 142 
82 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.”  
This study has reversed scores on the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index for ease of interpretation.  
83 World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 
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handpicks elite from the Family Council of Elders.85 The president therefore maintains a 
close and trusted circle of allies that have exclusive access to state wealth.  
In 2004, an international scandal involving Riggs Bank in Washington, DC exposed such 
exclusivity. According to various reports, the bank administered more than 60 accounts to the 
value of US400 million for the government of Equatorial Guinea between 1995 and 2004.86 
Investigations further revealed that Riggs serviced the accounts without adhering to any anti-
money laundering obligations. In the absence of these obligations, President Obiang and his 
family accepted million of dollars in cash deposits with few questions asked. The bank 
therefore held the entirety of the country’s oil wealth and subjected it to two signatures only: 
President Obiang and his son, Teodorin.87  
Teodorin himself has been tied to numerous scandals involving the country’s oil wealth given 
his lavish lifestyle. According to Global Witness, for example, Teodorin’s official 
government position of Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment generates a 
salary of around US$4000 – US$5000 per month only.88 On this salary, however the 
president’s son was able to spend US$35 million on a property in Malibu Beach in 2009.89 
The NGO claims that it would have taken him “somewhere between 580 to 730 years to 
squirrel away enough money to buy his Malibu property, assuming he had no other expenses 
and paid no taxes on his [official] income.”90 This exclusive access to the country’s oil 
wealth further enables Teodorin to spend lavishly on private jets, luxury cars and boats. His 
personal shopping sprees between 2004 and 2007, for example, amounted to nearly double 
the country’s education budget for 2005.91  
This predatory nature of politically exposed persons has contributed to international 
condemnation of Equatorial Guinea. In 2010, for example, the EITI expelled the state from 
its ranks.    
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The EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification 
and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and 
mining.92 Equatorial Guinea initially expressed its willingness to participate in the 
organisation at a World Bank-sponsored workshop in 2004. The EITI accepted the nation as a 
candidate country in 2007 where it granted Equatorial Guinea three years to validate all its 
measures.93 By April 2010 however, Africa’s third largest oil producer faced expulsion from 
the body on the grounds of government suppression. The EITI highlighted the following 
obstacles to transparency and accountability in the state: weak capacity, government 
restrictions on freedom of expression and association, hostile government rhetoric and actions 
against independent actors.94  
Equatorial Guinea thus fails to meet international standards on good governance as President 
Obiang continues to concentrate resource wealth in the hands of his allies, which only serves 
to marginalise the poor.    
Unchanging living standards 
The discovery of oil has supplied Equatorial Guinea with unprecedented opportunity for 
development. Although its GDP per capita remains the highest in Africa and not far off from 
the likes of Luxembourg, 60 percent of the population have an income below $350 per year.95 
Citizens located in urban areas such as Malabo and Bata also endure the cost of weak 
development as they lack access to basic facilities where three out of five households have no 
running water or electricity.96 With such discrepancies between receipts and reality, 
Equatorial Guinea has one of the lowest human development index (HDI)97 rankings in 
relation to its income per capita. 
As illustrated in the statistical models of chapters Three and Four, oil wealth coupled with 
autocracy and high corruption does not necessarily worsen poverty levels but merely creates 
a situation where the living standards of a population neither progress nor regress. Equatorial 
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Guinea personifies these findings, as the living standards of its people today are not 
dissimilar from that before oil wealth entered the economy. The country’s score on the HPI, 
for example, remains the same as it did a decade ago at 31.9.98  
Long-term outlooks for the people of this oil-rich nation fail to paint a better picture. Analysts 
maintain that President Obiang and his government will only seek to increase their stake in 
the country’s oil wealth thereby contributing to significant uncertainty regarding the future 
economic conditions and living standards of the population.99  
Concluding remarks 
During a presidential rally in 2002, President Obiang foresaw and promised great opportunity 
and change from the country’s oil wealth. As he addressed the crowds he declared, “like the 
scriptures say when the Pharaoh of Egypt had a dream of lean and fat cows, we have passed 
the time of lean cows that represent hunger and we are now in the time of fat cows which is 
prosperity.”100 Unfortunately, the people of Equatorial Guinea have not experienced this 
dream. On the contrary, they have lived only in the shadow of that fairytale alluded to by 
Kapuscinski. 
Authoritarian rule, entrenched over four decades, along with untold levels of corruption are 
the primary culprits for this paradoxical reality. The exclusivity of wealth is so stark that 
social scientists claim that the key problem is not even so much corruption “but the fact that 
all of the oil revenue goes to a tiny elite around the President’s family and friends.”101 Little 
has therefore changed in the country since independence. Where the British once referred to 
the country during World War 2 as a “little dreadful Spanish island” for example, an aid 
worker recently noted that, “on a scale of one to ten, even an African scale, it’s a zero.”102 
Equatorial Guinea is therefore the absolute personification of the statistical models presented 
in this study. Without sound institutions and greater civil and public participation, President 
Obiang and politically exposed persons will be able to continue to prey on the state to the 
detriment of the poor. Moreover, as Teodorin prepares to become the future president of this 
West African nation, the most vulnerable populations face innumerable challenges ahead.  
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Case Study: Gabon 
The story of Gabon is to some degree one of great exception as this small tropical country on 
the west coast of Africa largely defies the defining characteristics of its region. With 
neighbours that include the likes of Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo, 
Gabon’s peaceful history, which remains free from civil war, is unprecedented. Moreover, the 
reign of President Omar Bongo from 1967 to 2009,103 albeit of one-party rule, cannot be 
placed in the same league as that of Presidents Nguema, Paul Biya or even Denis Sassou 
Nguesso. On the contrary, Bongo’s presidency was more open and even encouraged civil 
society engagement toward the end of his rule. This study believes that these small 
exceptions have contributed to better use of the country’s vast fuel revenues to achieve 
meaningful development.  
Although most social scientists do not perceive Gabon as an exemplary model of good 
governance, to which this study admits the country has many faults, the small differences 
between it and its neighbour have contributed to better development and improved living 
standards. This chapter will highlight these differences to demonstrate how even small 
changes to freedom in society generate beneficial outcomes in the face of fuel revenues. In 
this regard, this chapter will review the political economy of Gabon in comparison to that of 
its neighbour: Equatorial Guinea.   
Political history 
Gabon achieved independence from France in 1960 after nearly five decades of colonial rule 
as one of four territories in French Equatorial Africa. The country’s first president was Léon 
M’ba who faced and survived an attempted coup during his brief seven-year reign. Following 
his death in 1967, the people of Gabon voted in President Bongo to replace him. Admittedly, 
political oppression marked the first 20 years of his 40-year rule as by March 1968 President 
Bongo had declared Gabon a one-party state under the Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG).  
In 1990, however, in face of internal and external pressure, President Bongo granted the 
hosting of multi-party legislative elections. Although he remained in power for almost 
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another 20 years, this change saw Gabon begin to witness greater political debate as well as 
the birth of civil society.104  
This change in political management resulted in Gabon hosting various elections until 
President Bongo’s death in 2009. Despite some dissent surrounding these events, external 
observers and the international community largely regarded them as credible and thereby free 
and fair.105 In addition to the advent of political openness in the state, the people of Gabon 
enjoy greater political rights and civil liberties than their counterparts in Equatorial Guinea. 
Freedom to form and join political parties, for example, is largely respected. Moreover, 
although somewhat limited in practice, legislation guarantees press freedom in the country as 
well as the right of assembly and association. Religious freedom is also enshrined in the 
constitution, which the people established in 1991, and is generally upheld by authorities.106  
Given these milestones of greater openness, Freedom House categorised Gabon as Partly 
Free for not only when this study selected data for its models in 2008 but for almost ten years 
before then as well.107 The statistical models therefore consider Gabon as Free whilst on the 
contrary; Equatorial Guinea has never matured past Not Free in its history. 
Fuel wealth and managed corruption 
Hydrocarbon exploration in Gabon originally began in the 1930s although the country only 
commenced production in the 1950s under the auspices of the French government.108 
Gabon’s access to fuel wealth thus spans over more than half a century where, admittedly, 
less accountable regimes generated a large portion of these revenues. Since the 1990s 
however, the country has experienced improved governance measures and greater 
transparency given its openness as discussed above. This latter period requires attention.  
As noted in the case study of Equatorial Guinea, Worldwide Governance Indicators stem 
back to the mid 1990s. When reviewing the corruption index for Gabon during this period, a 
significant pattern emerges.  
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Hydrocarbon production peaked in Gabon at 365 thousand barrels of oil per day in 1996.109 
Interestingly, this is also the year that its level of corruption was its highest as thereafter it 
generally decreased.110 This confirms the positive relationship between fuel wealth and 
unaccountability as identified in the statistical models for democracies and non-democracies 
alike in Chapter Four. Although access to fuel wealth has spurred on greater corruption in 
both case studies, the level of unaccountability has always been less in Gabon than Equatorial 
Guinea despite striking similarities in fuel production and its wealth per capita.  
Gabon’s score on the corruption index, for example, has never exceeded positive 1.02 over 
the course of the past 15 years.111 In comparison, Equatorial Guinea’s lowest score is positive 
1.21 only.112 Moreover, the past decade and a half has witnessed Gabon scoring as much as 
20 percent lower on the scale than its counterpart: a difference large enough to distinguish 
between some developing and developed nations. This finding personifies Figure Three and 
Four in Chapter Four, which demonstrated the diverging levels of corruption in non-
democratic and democratic states. Although the obstacle of unaccountability exists for both 
oil-rich nations, it remains larger in Equatorial Guinea given its regime type. Gabon thus 
achieves better governance of its fuel revenues because of its somewhat open society. One 
such measure that demonstrates this is its adherence to the EITI. 
In 2004, the government of Gabon informed the World Bank of its country’s commitment to 
join the EITI and requested technical support for its implementation. Since then, this small 
West African nation has produced three EITI reports, which provide information on the 
government’s share of oil profits:113 reports that Equatorial Guinea failed to produce. 
Although Gabon has not validated all EITI requirements, thus contributing to its status as a 
candidate and not a compliant country, the organisation has nevertheless categorised it as 
‘close to complaint.’114 The thus EITI views Gabon as having made meaningful progress to 
greater transparency and has granted it until December 2012 to implement all its 
commitments.115 
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The example of Gabon’s adherence to the EITI demonstrates that the country is firmly on the 
path to achieve transparency of its fuel revenues. Moreover, the international community has 
greater faith in Gabon than Equatorial Guinea to reach such milestones as the organisation 
expelled the latter from its ranks in 2010. When considering international perceptions of the 
two countries, a review of the Revenue Watch Index is also useful.  
This index considers Gabon as having achieved partial revenue transparency in that it 
provides citizens with information about country revenues from the extractive sector. 
According to the organisation, for example, Gabon has achieved 41.8 percent transparency of 
its resources.116 On the contrary, Equatorial Guinea has ‘scant’ revenue accountability as it 
discloses the least amount of information to its people and has poor reporting practices. It 
therefore scores right at the bottom of the index, only better than Turkmenistan, with 11.6 
percent levels of transparency.117  
This difference in commitment to better governance of resource revenues has translated into 
higher living standards in Gabon as fuel wealth has contributed to enhanced development.  
Development through resource wealth 
A review of developmental indicators for Gabon over the past 20 years reveals that this small 
West African nation has achieved steady and continuous growth. 
Gabon’s score on the HDI, for example, has increased since it embarked on greater political 
and economic freedom. Where the country’s score was 0.61 in 1990, it has grown to 0.67 
today.118 Although this increase may seem slight, it has enabled it to score well above 
average measures of growth for not only sub-Saharan Africa but also for countries classified 
in the ‘medium human development’ category. Gabon’s growth therefore diverges from that 
of the developing world to track greater global trends. A closer examination of specific 
indicators demonstrates this achievement.  
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The under five-mortality rate per 1000 live births, for example, has declined in Gabon from 
93 in 1990 to 69 in 2009.119 Moreover, life expectancy has also slowly increased over the 
past two decades to 62.7 years today.120 Apart from health, education indicators in Gabon 
also remain relatively higher than its African counterparts where expected adult literacy rate 
for both sexes above the age of 15 is high at 87.7 percent.121  
Taken together, along with other measures, these indicators have resulted in Gabon scoring 
very low on the HPI. In 2008, Gabon scored a disproportionately low 17.5: almost 15 units 
lower than Equatorial Guinea at 31.9.122  
In comparison to the rest of the continent and most importantly its neighbour, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon therefore seems leagues ahead in terms of meaningful human development.  
Concluding remarks 
As noted in the opening paragraph on the case study of Gabon, this country is a story of great 
exception. Like so many African countries, Gabon has witnessed a history of one party rule 
as well as resource-led corruption. It was President Bongo after all who declared, “Corruption 
is not African word.”123 Despite these challenges however, this small West African nation 
has channelled its resource wealth to achieve remarkable levels of development. This study is 
confident that such wealth has spurred this progress, given that fuel revenues constitute more 
than half of the nation’s income. 
In comparing Equatorial Guinea to Gabon, this chapter first noted striking similarities 
between the two nations. In this regard, the countries share the same access to resource 
wealth as well as the same opportunity to harness it to achieve meaningful development given 
the small population size that characterizes both states. Differences lie in the reality that 
Gabon has embarked on greater openness and freedom in society however, whilst Equatorial 
Guinea continues to display draconian behaviour.  
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Although Gabon still has a long way to go to achieve absolute freedom and transparency, it is 
the small changes it has made to political rights, civil liberties and adherence to international 
standards that has enabled it to move forward and track global trends. On the contrary, 
Equatorial Guinea remains suspended in time. The strength of its institutions continues to 
deteriorate whilst the living standards of its population neither progress nor regress. By 
failing to achieve better governance of its resources, Equatorial Guinea has thus missed its 
opportunity to realise its status as the Kuwait of Africa and remains a tropical backwater.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This paper sought to determine the relationship between oil in Africa and human 
development. As Africa is set to emerge as a significant player in the hydrocarbons market 
within the next few decades, the generation of such resources will afford its people with an 
unprecedented opportunity to harness a vast stream of wealth to achieve meaningful 
development. Bearing in mind that the continent hosts some of the most impoverished 
regions in the world, an assessment of the political economy of oil is imperative to unlocking 
this different future.  
To determine the effects of oil in Africa, this paper first began by quantifying the most basic 
and direct relationship between this resource and living standards across the continent. With 
fuel revenues per capita as the measurement for oil and the HPI as the measurement for 
human development, Chapter Two essentially ran a test on the resource curse. In doing so, it 
negated former assumptions as such revenues appear to neither improve not worsen the living 
standards of African people. This finding even suggested that should an African country 
experience an oil boom, it would have no effect on eradicating poverty whatsoever thus 
rendering such revenues negligible. This finding only warranted more questions however, as 
Chapter Three sought to discover why such wealth is so futile to the continent.  
In turning to isolate the role of corruption, Chapter Three identified an important domino 
effect that accounted for this counterintuitive reality. Firstly, it noted that an increase in fuel 
revenues itself generates greater corruption in African states. This association mirrors various 
findings in the literature on the resource curse. Thereafter, it identified that this increase in 
unaccountability in turn results in poor development: the second and most important phase of 
the domino effect. Where an increase in fuel revenues has the potential to contribute to 
economic benefits in a state, corruption cancels out this future almost exactly. What results is 
stagnation through which the living standards of African people neither progress nor regress 
despite increased resource revenues.  
Chapter Four sought to determine the role of regime types in mitigating this unwanted 
outcome. By differentiating between democratic and non-democratic oil-rich African states, 
Chapter Four noted that although an increase in fuel revenues generates more corruption in 
both regimes: the domino effect remains multiple times more destructive in the authoritarian 
state. In this regard, the open and representative state holds greater promise for harnessing 
hydrocarbon revenues to achieve meaningful development and raise living standards.  
46 
 
The case studies of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon demonstrate these opposing realities. 
Where these states remain remarkably similar in terms of their access to resource wealth as 
well as their political economic and geographic make-ups, Gabon has achieved greater 
freedom than its counterpart has. In doing so, it has been able to track global trends in 
development and disassociate itself from much of the continent. This small West African 
nation therefore provides useful lessons for all upcoming oil producers from the continent.  
With the above analysis, this paper serves to demonstrate that the resource curse is a by-
product of poor governance only. Moreover, through the establishment of statistical models, 
it has been able to track the effects of corruption and regime type exactly, generating a more 
holistic understanding of the paradox of plenty. This understanding has important 
implications. 
Freedom House classicisation of many of the upcoming oil producers set to emerge from the 
continent, for example, is at best Partly Free, with the exceptions of Ghana and Namibia. 
Many authoritarian governments are therefore looking to the hydrocarbons industry to secure 
their reign on power through access to immense resource wealth. In this event, the people of 
Africa face a long road ahead of them where the possibility of missed opportunities, such as 
with Equatorial Guinea, remains a constant and very real threat. Local and international 
communities must therefore help to facilitate greater freedom in countries as this remains the 
only solution to overcoming the all too familiar domino effect in which fuel revenues fail to 
benefit the masses and counter intuitively result in stagnant human development.  
Although this research contributes to the literature by identifying the very mechanisms of the 
domino effect, future research that turns to examine how different communities may enhance 
transparency is further required. Moreover, social scientists are encouraged to extend this 
finding to assess the political economy of oil and human development in all developing 
regions of the world.  
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Appendix 
Chapter Two: Oil, Poverty and the Resource Curse 
Table 2.1:   Countries excluded from the dataset 
Country Reason 
Comoros Island state 
Lesotho Disproportionately 
small state 
Liberia Data unavailability 
Madagascar Island state 
Mauritius Island state 
Mayotte Island state 
Sao tome 
and Principe 
Island state and 
data unavailability 
Seychelles Island state 
Sierra Leone Date unavailability 
Somalia Data unavailability 
Swaziland Disproportionately 
small state 
Zimbabwe Data unavailability 
 
Table 2.2: Human Poverty Index (HPI) scores for the dataset. Taken from the Human 
Development Report of 2009 
Country HPI percentages Country (cont.) 
HPI 
percentages 
(cont.) 
Algeria 17.5 Mali 54.5 
Angola 37.2 Mauritania 36.2 
Benin 43.2 Morocco 31.1 
Botswana 22.9 Mozambique 46.8 
Burkina Faso 51.8 Namibia 17.1 
Burundi 36.4 Niger 55.8 
Cameroon 30.8 Nigeria 36.2 
Central African 
Republic 
42.9 Rwanda 32.9 
Chad 53.1 Senegal 41.6 
Congo, Republic 24.3 South Africa 25.4 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
38.0 Sudan 34.0 
Cote D’Ivoire 37.4 Tanzania 30.0 
Djibouti 25.6 Togo 36.6 
Egypt 23.4 Tunisia 15.6 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
31.9 Uganda 28.8 
Eritrea 33.7 Zambia 35.5 
Ethiopia 50.9   
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Gabon  17.5   
Gambia 40.9   
Ghana 28.1   
Guinea 50.5   
Guinea-Bissau 34.9   
Kenya 29.5   
Libya 13.4   
Malawi 28.3   
 
Table 2.3:  $US equivalent of fuel revenues per capita for 2008 
   (rounded off to the nearest whole number) 
Country 
Fuel revenues 
per capita in 
$US 
Country (cont.) 
Fuel revenues  
per capita 
(cont.) 
Algeria 2198 Mali 2 
Angola 3667 Mauritania 102 
Benin 0 Morocco 27 
Botswana 9 Mozambique 13 
Burkina Faso 0 Namibia 10 
Burundi 0 Niger 1 
Cameroon 144 Nigeria 496 
Central African 
Republic 
0 Rwanda 0 
Chad 31 Senegal 60 
Congo, Republic 2215 South Africa 146 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
4 Sudan 216 
Cote D’Ivoire 176 Tanzania 31 
Djibouti 16 Togo 0 
Egypt 142 Tunisia 324 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
20304 Uganda 2 
Eritrea 0 Zambia 3 
Ethiopia 0   
Gabon  5650   
Gambia 0   
Ghana 2   
Guinea 2   
Guinea-Bissau 0   
Kenya 5   
Libya 6200   
Malawi 0   
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Table 2.4  $US equivalent of non fuel revenues per capita for 2008 
   (rounded off to the nearest whole number) 
Country 
Non fuel 
revenues per 
capita in $US 
Country (cont.) 
Non fuel 
revenues  
per capita 
(cont.) 
Algeria 2188 Mali 686 
Angola 1047 Mauritania 788 
Benin 771 Morocco 1745 
Botswana 6974 Mozambique 427 
Burkina Faso 522 Namibia 4139 
Burundi 144 Niger 363 
Cameroon 1082 Nigeria 873 
Central African 
Republic 
458 Rwanda 459 
Chad 739 Senegal 1027 
Congo, Republic 751 South Africa 5532 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
178 Sudan 1137 
Cote D’Ivoire 959 Tanzania 482 
Djibouti 847 Togo 449 
Egypt 1786 Tunisia 2743 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
7796 Uganda 451 
Eritrea 336 Zambia 1131 
Ethiopia 317   
Gabon  4387   
Gambia 489   
Ghana 711   
Guinea 385   
Guinea-Bissau 273   
Kenya 778   
Libya 7678   
Malawi 288   
 
Table 2.5  Population size for 2008 
   (in millions) 
Country Population Country (cont.) Population (cont.) 
Algeria 34.4 Mali 12.7 
Angola 18.0 Mauritania 3.2 
Benin 8.6 Morocco 31.6 
Botswana 1. 9 Mozambique 22.4 
Burkina Faso 15.2 Namibia 2.1 
Burundi 8. 1 Niger 14.7 
Cameroon 19.1 Nigeria 151.2 
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Central African 
Republic 
4.3 
 
Rwanda 9.8 
Chad 10.9 Senegal 12.2 
Congo, Republic 3.6 South Africa 48.7 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
64.3 Sudan 41.3 
Cote D’Ivoire 20.6 Tanzania 1.2 
Djibouti 0.8 Togo 42.5 
Egypt 81.5 Tunisia 10.3 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0.7 Uganda 31.7 
Eritrea 4.9 Zambia 12.6 
Ethiopia 80.7   
Gabon  1.5   
Gambia 1.7   
Ghana 23.4   
Guinea 9.8   
Guinea-Bissau 1.6   
Kenya 38.8   
Libya 6.3   
Malawi 14.8   
 
Table 2.6  Coastal dummy coding (1=coastal state) 
Country Dummy code Country (cont.) Dummy Code (cont.) 
Algeria 1 Mali 0 
Angola 1 Mauritania 1 
Benin 1 Morocco 1 
Botswana 0 Mozambique 1 
Burkina Faso 0 Namibia 1 
Burundi 0 Niger 0 
Cameroon 1 Nigeria 1 
Central African 
Republic 
0 
 
Rwanda 0 
Chad 0 Senegal 1 
Congo, Republic 1 South Africa 1 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
0 Sudan 1 
Cote D’Ivoire 1 Tanzania 1 
Djibouti 1 Togo 1 
Egypt 1 Tunisia 1 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1 Uganda 0 
Eritrea 1 Zambia 0 
 
Ethiopia 0   
Gabon  1   
Gambia 1   
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Ghana 1   
Guinea 1   
Guinea-Bissau 1   
Kenya 1   
Libya 1   
Malawi 0   
 
Table 2.7:  Results from the Bivariate Regression Model: 
The relationship between fuel revenues per capita and a country’s score  on 
the HPI. HPI is the dependent variable 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) -1.14* 0.34 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.22 
 
Table 2.8:  Results from the Multivariate Regression Model: 
   The relationship between fuel revenues per capita and a country’s score on the  
   HPI controlling for non-fuel revenues per capita, coastal states and the size of 
   a country’s population. HPI is the dependent variable. 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) 0.04 0.45 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) -5.73* 1.92 
Coastal dummy -6.14 3.4 
Population (logged)  0.59 1.05 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.43 
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Chapter Three: the Role of Corruption 
Table 3.1:  Corruption scores for the dataset taken from the World Bank in 2008  
   (The original Control of Corruption index provided by the World Bank has  
    been reversed so that higher numbers correspond with  
   higher levels of corruption) 
Country Corruption Score Country (cont.) 
Corruption 
Score 
Algeria 0.49 Mali 0.69 
Angola 1.34 Mauritania 0.66 
Benin 0.65 Morocco 0.23 
Botswana -0.86 Mozambique 0.41 
Burkina Faso 0.44 Namibia -0.23 
Burundi 1.12 Niger 0.66 
Cameroon 0.92 Nigeria 1.07 
Central African 
Republic 
0.82 Rwanda -0.13 
Chad 1.39 Senegal 0.53 
Congo, Republic 1.22 South Africa -0.1 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
1.42 Sudan 1.24 
Cote D’Ivoire 1.16 Tanzania 0.42 
Djibouti 0.26 Togo 1.08 
Egypt 0.41 Tunisia -0.02 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1.58 Uganda 0.87 
Eritrea 0.33 Zambia 0.51 
Ethiopia 0.71   
Gabon  0.92   
Gambia 0.56   
Ghana -0.06   
Guinea 1.23   
Guinea-Bissau 1.12   
Kenya 1.11   
Libya 1.1   
Malawi 0.47   
 
Table 3.2  Results from the Multivariate Regression Model with Corruption included 
  The relationship between fuel revenues per capita and poverty with corruption 
   included as an intervening variable.  
Part 1:   The HPI is the dependent variable 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Corruption* 6.09 3.16 
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Fuel revenues per capita (logged) -0.46 0.51 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) -3.31 2.23 
Coastal dummy -6.48 3.29 
Population (logged)  0.56 1.02 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.48 
 
Part 2:  Corruption is the dependent variable 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) 0.08* 0.02 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) -0.4* 0.1 
Coastal dummy 0.06 0.17 
Population (logged)  0.01 0.05 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.36 
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Chapter Four: Democratic and non Democratic Oil Producers 
Table 4.1  Categorization of regime types across the data set 
   (0=Not Free; 1=Free) 
Country Dummy code Country (cont.) Dummy Code (cont.) 
Algeria 0 Mali 1 
Angola 0 Mauritania 1 
Benin 1 Morocco 1 
Botswana 1 Mozambique 1 
Burkina Faso 1 Namibia 1 
Burundi 1 Niger 1 
Cameroon 0 Nigeria 1 
Central African 
Republic 
1 
 
Rwanda 0 
Chad 0 Senegal 1 
Congo, Republic 0 South Africa 1 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep 
0 Sudan 0 
Cote D’Ivoire 0 Tanzania 1 
Djibouti 1 Togo 1 
Egypt 0 Tunisia 0 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 Uganda 1 
Eritrea 0 Zambia 1 
 
Ethiopia 1   
Gabon  1   
Gambia 1   
Ghana 1   
Guinea 0   
Guinea-Bissau 1   
Kenya 1   
Libya 0   
Malawi 1   
 
Table 4.2  Results from the Multivariate Regression Model with Regime Type included 
  The different relationships between fuel revenues per capita, corruption and   
   and poverty when regimes types are considered. Regime type is included as an 
   interaction variable 
Part 1:   The HPI is the dependent variable 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Corruption 7.83* 0.03 
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) -0.69 0.71 
59 
 
Freedom = True 5.01 4.75 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged)  -2.8 2.35 
Coastal dummy -6.63 3.41 
Population size (logged)       0.71      1.04 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True      0.46      0.73 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.50 
 
Part 2:  Corruption is the dependent variable 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) 0.11* 0.03 
Freedom = True -0.61* 0.20 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) -0.39* 0.09 
Coastal dummy 0.10 0.16 
Population (logged)      -0.01      0.05 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True     -0.08*      0.03 
   
*p value is <0.05 which is statistically significant   
 
R – Squared: 0.51 
 
Table 4.3:  Results from simulating differences in Fuel Revenues per Capita on 
   Corruption for Democracies 
Part 1.1: Low fuel revenues per capita 
 Values 
  
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) -14.68 
Freedom = True 1.00 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) 6.79 
Coastal dummy 0.71 
Population (logged)      16.20 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True     -14.68 
  
 
Part 2:   High fuel revenues per capita 
 Values 
  
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) 3.00 
Freedom = True 1.00 
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Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) 6.79 
Coastal dummy 0.71 
Population (logged)      16.20 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True     3.00 
  
  
 
Part 3:   Expected Values 
 Values 
  
Mean 0.25 
Standard deviation 0.26 
97.5 percent confidence interval 0.76 
  
  
 
Part 4:   First Difference in Expected Values 
 Values 
  
Mean 0.51 
Standard deviation 0.49 
97.5 percent confidence interval 1.48 
  
  
 
Table 4.4  Results from simulating differences in Fuel Revenues per Capita on  
   Corruption for Non-Democracies 
Part 1:   Low fuel revenues per capita 
 Values 
  
Fuel revenues per capita (logged) -14.68 
Freedom = True 0.00 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) 6.79 
Coastal dummy 0.71 
Population (logged)      16.20 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True     0.00 
  
 
Part 2:   High fuel revenues per capita 
 Values 
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Fuel revenues per capita (logged) 3.00 
Freedom = True 0.00 
Non fuel revenues per capita (logged) 6.79 
Coastal dummy 0.71 
Population (logged)      16.20 
Fuel revenues per capita: Freedom = True     0.00 
  
 
Part 3:   Expected values 
 Values 
  
Mean -0.38 
Standard deviation 0.34 
97.5 percent confidence interval 0.27 
  
  
 
Part 4:   First difference in expected values 
 Values 
  
Mean 2.02 
Standard deviation 0.50 
97.5 percent confidence interval 2.96 
  
  
 
